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Frontiers in Question
Introduction1
... th e  p resen ce  o f fro n tie rs  is in h e re n t to the political as such ... the re  
is only  po litics w here th e re  are fron tiers ...2
... it is im possible to  clarify the  concep tual status o f  th e  fro n tie r w ith­
o u t w ork ing  th ro u g h  its po litical status ... th e re  is a t th e  very least an 
u neasy  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  d esire  to  establish  sh a rp  conceptual 
bo u n d arie s  on  th e  o n e  h an d , an d  on the  other, to  abolish political fro n ­
tiers th ro u g h  cosm opolitan ism  ...3
... the tex t overruns all the  limits assigned to it so far (no t subm erging or 
d row ning them  in an  undifferen tia ted  homogeneity, b u t ra the r m aking 
th em  m ore  com plex, dividing and  m ultiplying strokes an d  lines) ...4
These remarks, extracted from the writings of Laclau, Bennington and 
Derrida, all touch upon one of the most central problematics of our times, 
namely, the issue of frontiers. It arises, not only in the full immediacy and 
urgency of practical politics, but also in politico-philosophical reflection on 
closure and limits.5 The problem  of frontiers is thus not indicative of a sin-
1 An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the ‘Interdisciplinary Group on 
Race, Ethnicity and N ationalism ’ of the University o f Southam pton in January 1996, 
as well as at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Glasgow 1996. I 
would like to thank Mark Devenney, David Howarth and Kate Nash for com ments on 
earlier drafts of this article.
2 E. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, London 1990, p. 160.
3 G. B ennington, Legislations. The Politics of Deconstruction, Verso, London 1994, p. 262.
4 J. Derrida, ‘Living on: b o rd erlin e s’, p. 257 in P. Kamuf (ed.), A Derrida Reader. Between 
the Blinds, H arvester W heatsheaf, London 1991. It is im portant to note that Derrida 
here explicitly denounces the ‘nonreading’ which claims that the text is to be dissolved 
in to  an ex tra tex tual realm . Rather, he argues that he sought to ‘work out the 
theoretical and practical systems of these m argins’.
5 It should thus be clear from  the start that even where the sheer physicality o f borders 
force themselves onto us, the ir significance is essentially a symbolic one. In this respect
I would argue, following Balibar, that every social community reproduced by the 
functioning o f institutions is imaginary, and that the distinction between real and 
imaginary com m unities is therefore a fallacious one. See, E. Balibar, ’The nation 
form: history and ideology’, p. 93, in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class. 
Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London 1991.
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gular problem . Rather, it signifies a com plex nexus o f irreducible issues 
which, nevertheless, are difficult to separate from one another. Indeed, what 
is at stake in the multiple ways of approaching the question o f frontiers, is 
precisely the problem of separation, distinction, and differentiation (rather 
than separateness, distinctness and difference) which simultaneously raises 
questions concerning belonging, holding-together, and solidarity.6
This paper addresses the complex relation between the m ore general 
conceptual, and specifically political questions concerning limits and fron­
tiers,7 and it does so in the context of contem porary post-structuralist de­
bates on the nature of political identity and ideology.8 Even a brief survey 
of literature in this field reveals a strong preoccupation with questions con­
cerning the theorisation of political identity in terms o f the perm eability of 
boundaries between and around identities, and the relation of identities to 
the construction and contestation of larger social im aginaries.9 For the 
purposes of this arücle, I have chosen to concentrate on Laclau and M ouffe’s 
theorisation of the idea of political frontiers.10 This ra ther specific focus
6 The question of frontiers politically is thus intimately bound up with the establishment of 
distinctions, for example, between insiders and the outsiders, citizens and non-citizens, 
citizens and refugees. For a discussion o f the significance o f the refugee in our 
contemporary world, see M. Dillon, ‘The scandal of the refugee: the production of the 
abjection the international politics of sovereign subjectivity, and the advent of another 
justice’. Paper presented to the conference: Sovereignty and Subjectivity, University of 
Wales, Aberystwyth, September 1995. For a discussion of the question of boundaries in 
political theory, see S. Wolin, ‘Fugitive democracy’, pp. 31-45, in S. Benhabib (ed.) Democracy 
andDifference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
1996.
7 This very distinction is not one which is unproblem atic. With regard to a ‘purely’ 
conceptual clarification, one has to ask with Wittgenstein whether ‘the engine is idling’? 
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, remark 88, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1968.
8 The term ‘ideology’ is used here, not as an indicator of false consciousness or as a merely 
superstructural phenom enon, but as a necessary and inescapable elem ent o f any social 
formation. As Lefort argues, any society in order to be itself, has to forge a representation 
of itself, and I take ideology to be a result o f discursive attempts to forge such an imaginary. 
See, C. Lefort, The Political Forms of Modem Society, Polity Press, Cambridge 1986.
9 Two recent collections in which these issues are raised are, I. Grewal and C. Kaplan (eds.), 
Scattered Hegemonies, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1994; and L. Nicholson 
and S. Seidman (eds.), Social Postmodernism. Beyond Identity Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1995.
10 The idea of political frontiers was first elaborated in E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London 1985. Later 
works contain reformulations o f im portant aspects o f the theory o f hegemony, but do 
not return to the question of political frontiers. See, E. Laclau, New Reflections on the 
Revolution of our Time, Verso, London 1990; and C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 
Verso, London 1993; and E. Laclau, Emancipation(s), Verso, London 1996.
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enables me to raise some of the more general, as well as more specific prob­
lems alluded to above, for the theorisation offered by Laclau and Mouffe is 
one  o f  a few system atic a ttem p ts to engage with the  im plications of 
deconstruction and post-structuralism for the analysis of political identity and 
ideology.
I. The Genealogy of a Problem
The question of limits and of frontiers in Laclau and Mouffe’s work 
arises as a result o f the m ovem ent from a Marxist to a post-Marxist frame­
work o f analysis. O nce the unity of society is no longer viewed as a result of 
the workings of the necessary laws of history, and political and social identi­
ties are no longer conceived on the basis of their insertion into relations of 
production, the question of the m anner in which identities are forged and 
the unity of the social is produced, has to be addressed anew. It is on this 
terrain that the problem atic o f limits and frontiers first arises.
In this respect, Laclau and Mouffe’s work on hegemony, subjectivity 
and radical dem ocracy form s part of a larger panoram a of post-Marxist 
writings -  including, for exam ple, the work of E tienne Balibar, Jacques 
Ranciere, Claude Lefort, and  Stuart Hall — all of which operate with a 
working assum ption of the non-closure of the social and the constitutive 
character of difference.11 T hat is, their starting-point is a negation of deter­
m inism  and  o f any a priori, underly ing logic as providing a necessary 
unificatory principle to social and political identities and discursive forma­
tions. Laclau puts it in the following manner:
T h e  im possib ility  o f  th e  ob jec t ‘society’ is fo u n d ed  in th e  de-cen tred  
c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  social, in  th e  u ltim ately  arb itra ry  ch a rac te r o f social 
rela tions. B ut social -  o r  discursive -  p ractice can only exist as an effort 
to  constitu te  th a t im possible object, to lim it the  arbitrary, to  constitute 
a ce n tre . A nd  this c e n tre  ... [is] always precarious, always th rea ten e d  
12
Likewise, Lefort argues that
... a society can  re la te  to  itself, can exist as a hum an  society, only on the 
co n d itio n  th a t it forges a rep resen ta tio n  o f its unity ...13
11 T hat is no t to say tha t there are not considerable differences between these writers. 
T h e re  are, an d  they shou ld  n o t be neglected. They do, nevertheless, form  a 
recognisable ‘school’ o f thought.
12 E. Laclau, ‘Transform ation of Advanced Industrial Societies and the Theory of the 
Subject’, Argument-Sonderband, AS 84, p. 41.
13 Lefort, Political Forms o f Modern Society, p. 191.
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At stake here is clearly the question o f how, in the absence of either 
natural and given forms of identity, or laws of history regulating society, we 
are to make sense of and account for different forms of unification.14 In 
Laclau and Mouffe’s writings, the category of frontiers is in troduced to ad­
dress this question. Their argument, in brief, is the following: if any identity 
and, by extension, society is no longer a given and imm utable datum , if its 
character cannot be determ ined in a naturalistic fashion, then  it can also 
no longer be individuated on the grounds of positively attribu ted  charac­
teristics.15 Consequently, some o ther way of delim itation or individuation 
has to be found. Laclau and Mouffe locate this m echanism  o f delim itation 
in the drawing of frontiers: it is through the consolidation or dissolution of 
political frontiers, they argue, that discursive form ations in general, and 
social and political identities specifically, are constructed or fragm ented.16 
They argue:
... lim its only exist insofar as a system atic ensem ble  o f  d iffe rences can 
be cu t o u t as totality w ith reg a rd  to  so m e th in g  beyond th e m , a n d  it is 
only th ro u g h  this cu tting  o u t th a t th e  to tality  co n stitu tes  itse lf  as fo r­
m ation. ... it is clear th a t th a t b eyond  c a n n o t consist in  so m e th in g  posi­
tive -  in  a new  d ifference -  th en  th e  only possibility is th a t it will co n ­
sist in  som eth ing  negative. But we already  know  th a t th e  logic o f  equiva­
lence ... in troduces negativity in to  th e  field  o f  th e  social. T his im plies 
th a t a fo rm ation  m anages to signify itself ( th a t is, ... co n s titu te  itse lf as 
such) only by transfo rm ing  the  lim its in to  fro n tie rs , by co n s titu tin g  a 
chain  o f  equivalences which constructs w hat is beyond  th e  lim its as th a t 
w hich it is not. I t  is only th ro u g h  negativity, d ivision an d  an tag o n ism  
th a t a form ation  can constitu te itse lf as a to ta liz ing  horizon . T h e  logic 
o f equivalence ... is ... the m ost abstract an d  g en e ra l co n d itio n  o f  exist­
ence o f  every fo rm a tio n .17
14 The whole of Laclau and Mouffe’s work may arguably be said to  be an engagem ent 
with that question, in all its multifarious dim ensions.
15 Laclau and Mouffe argue in Hegemony, and Laclau in New Reflections tha t to affirm the 
essence of something consists in affirming its positive identity. See Laclau, New Reflections, 
p. 187.
16 Laclau, New Reflections, p. 160.
17 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 144. T he logic of equivalence is internally related to 
the presence of antagonistic relations. Laclau and Mouffe argue that ‘certain discursive 
forms, through equivalence, annul all positivity of the object and give a  real existence 
to negativity as such. This impossibility of the real -  negativity -  has attained a form  of 
presence ... negativity- that is ,... antagonism  ...’ Hegemony, p. 129. Laclau, in his la ter 
writings, in troduce the concept o f ‘d is lo ca tio n ’ w hich significantly  alters the  
theoretical status of the concept of ‘antagonism ’. In New Reflections, antagonism  
becomes one possible response to a dislocation, which has to be articulated politically; 
the conception of political frontiers are not, however, sim ultaneously reworked.
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Having established the general conditions which may delimit an iden­
tity o r discursive form ation, it is now necessary to turn to the political ar­
ticulation of these insights. In this respect it is necessary to trace out both 
the Marxist and non-Marxist intellectual resources upon which they draw in 
the course o f the elaboration of their argument.
The most im portant Marxist influences on the emergence of the prob­
lem of frontiers and its theorisation, is to be found in the writings of Gramsci 
and Sorel. Laclau and M ouffe’s work on hegemony and their anti-essential- 
ist critique of political identity draws heavily on the legacy of Gramsci. In­
deed, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, they situate their work explicitly in 
relation to the Gramscian moment, as an attem pt to recover some of the 
basic concep ts  o f G ram scian analysis, even while these concepts are 
radicalised in a direction leading ‘beyond’ Gramsci.18
It is in Gramsci’s theorisation of political subjectivity as collective will 
that Laclau and Mouffe locate both the last traces of a Marxist determinism 
and the first glimmerings of a non-deterministic conception of political iden­
tity which will shape their post-Marxist theorisation. Gramsci develops the 
idea of a collective will by drawing on insights from both Sorel and Lenin.19 
From Sorel, Gramsci takes the emphasis on political agency as animated 
through myth. Myth works as ‘a concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed 
and shattered people to arouse and organise its collective will’.20 A collec­
tive will is thus forged through the welding together of a set of elements with 
no necessary belonging. The influence of Lenin in this respect is also clear: 
from him  Gramsci takes the emphasis on agency as broader than particular 
classes.21 A com bination of both of these elements crystallises in the idea of 
a collective will. Such a will is:
... th e  p rec ip ita te  o f  a p lurality  o f  dem ands, political initiatives, trad i­
tio n s  a n d  c u ltu ra l in s titu tio n s , w hose always p rec a rio u s  un ity  is th e
18 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 136.
19 It is here tha t the influence of Sorel on Gramsci is perhaps at its clearest.
20 A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 126. A myth 
thus has to be distinguished from  a utopia, which is an intellectual construction that 
can be analysed and discussed, and that can be refuted. Sorel argues that a utopia 
leads people to reform s, while ‘ou r present myth leads people to prepare themselves 
fo r a battle  to  destroy what exists.’ Myths, therefore, in Sorel’s words, are not 
descriptions of things, bu t are expressions of will and groups of images that ‘can 
evoke as a to ta lity  ... th e  mass o f sen tim ents th a t co rrespond  to the various 
m anifestations of the war waged by socialism against m odern society’. Q uoted in Z. 
S ternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 62.
21 For L enin, o f course, this had m eant class-alliances which did not affect the identity 
of the classes so aligned.
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resu lt o f  the fusion  o f  these  h e te ro g e n e o u s  e lem e n ts  in to  g lobal im ­
ages co n s titu tin g  a ‘p o p u la r  re lig io n ’.22
The Gramscian theorisation o f political subjects as ‘collective wills’ 
contains both a non-essentialist, non-determ inistic dim ension, and a last 
deterministic core. As is clear from the characterisation offered by Laclau, 
collective wills are strictly speaking no t classes but arise from  a politico-ideo­
logical articulation of dispersed and fragm ented historical forces. Gramsci’s 
intervention, in this respect, can be read as a discourse on the genesis and 
formation of the historical subject, whose nature is no t immutable and fixed, 
but arises in a ‘becom ing’ which is ineradicably rooted  in the historical 
process.23 At the same time, however, Gramsci’s affirmation of the final class 
determination of a hegemonic formation, reaffirms an inner essentialist core 
which sets a limit to the logic of hegemony.24 Consequently, if one is to take 
the logic of hegemonic constitution seriously, then the identity o f subjects 
must be thought of as resulting from a multiplicity of practices of contin­
gent articulation and disarticulation, ra ther than having the status o f a pri­
ori ontological givens; the last traces of essentialism have to be eradicated 
from the theorisation of political identity.
Following from this, it becomes imperative to theorise the process of 
articulation through which identity is contigently brought into being. This, 
Laclau and Mouffe argue, should take place not on the grounds of positivities, 
but in terms of negativity or antagonism. T hat is, individuation has to be 
theorised not on the basis of one or ano ther positively identifiable charac­
teristic, for that would immediately lead us back into essentialist forms of 
argum entation, but in terms of that to which an identity is opposed. O n this 
reading, the unity of identity is produced only in so far as it is opposed to 
that which it is not, and such relations, are always antagonistic.
... in  th e  case o f an tagonism , ... th e  p resen ce  o f  the  ‘O th e r ’ p reven ts  
m e from  being  totally m yself.... I t  is because a p easan t cannot b e  a peas­
an t th a t an an tagonism  exists with th e  lan d o w n er expelling  h im  from  
his land .) Insofar as th e re  is an tagon ism , I c a n n o t be a fu ll p resen ce  
for myself. But n o r  is the force th a t antagonizes m e such a p resence : its 
objective being  is a symbol o f my non -being  and , in  this way, it is over­
flowed by a p lurality  o f m eanings w hich p rev e n t its b e in g  fixed  as full 
positivity.25
22 E. Laclau, ‘Gramsci’, unpublished paper.
23 B. Fontana, Hegemony and Power, University o f M innesota Press, M inneapolis 1993, p. 
1.
24 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, pp. 67-9.
25 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 125.
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It is crucial to proceed carefully here, for it is at this point that an 
im portant ethico-theoretical decision can be located in the argument.26 The 
m anner in which their critique of essentialist forms of argum entation is 
developed lead Laclau and Mouffe to a position which privileges the dimen­
sion o f negativity in the individuation of identity.27 In this process, the cri­
tique o f essentialist forms of theorising identity is conflated with the further 
proposition that the only m anner in which identity can be thought in a non- 
essentialist fashion is through negativity. I will pursue this argum ent and the 
consequences of this shift in more detail throughout this article. At this point 
it is simply necessary to highlight the fact that the way in which their critique 
of essentialism is articulated closes off o ther possibilities of thinking about 
identity which does not, at the outset, privilege the m oment of frontiers and 
antagonism s.28 As I will argue, what is presented as purely formal and ab­
stract conditions for the individuation of identity, in fact, already contains a 
set of rather thicker assumptions concerning the role of conflict in the proc­
ess of identity form ation.29
The com plaint against Gramsci is thus more complicated than what 
is overtly indicated by their reading. Given Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis 
on the role of antagonism  and negativity in the constitution of identity, it 
seems that the problem  with Gramsci is not only that he retains a final class
26 D errida developed the notion of an ethico-theoretical decision in his work. See, for 
exam ple, J. D errida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 
N orthwestern University Press, Evanston 1973. For Derrida, an ethico-theoretical 
decision both is and is not a decision. It is a decision insofar as o ther possibilities were 
present; it lacks the characteristics of a decision insofar as the very path chosen is 
determ ined  by the tradition  o f Western metaphysics.
2^ It is im portan t to note that the denial of the im portance o f difference is one which 
relates specifically to the individuation of identity. It is not that Laclau and Mouffe do 
no t give atten tion  to the logic o f difference, but that the focus on limits forces them 
to overem phasise the equivalential dimension.
28 I have in m ind here, as an alternative, aWittgenstinian position on family resemblances. 
This position allows one to take into account the positive dimensions of identity 
w ithout reducing  it to an essentialist sameness. AW ittgenstinian position could thus 
be developed to coun ter the excessive emphasis in Laclau and Mouffe’s work on the 
form ation of frontiers.
29 In Hegemony and  elsewhere, Laclau and Mouffe argue that what they present are 
characteristic o f all processes of individuation of identity in general. In a recent 
interview Laclau argues, for instance, that he has tried to show in different works that 
‘political boundaries are n e ither the result of a contingent im perfection of society, 
n o r even of an em pirical impossibility o f overcoming the latter, but, instead, of the 
impossibility o f constituting any social identity except through acts of exclusion.’ D. 
Howarth and  A. J. Norval, ‘Negotiation the paradoxes of contem porary politics. An 
interview with Ernesto Laclau’, Angelaki, vol. 1, no. 3, 1994, p. 46.
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core, but also that he does not break with thinking about identity in positive terms. 
Not only does he retain a final class core in his analysis, he also holds onto a 
conception of collective wills which on Laclau and Mouffe’s account is ultimately 
incoherent. Its incoherence results from the fact that while it provides us with a 
conception of identity as an articulated ensemble of elements, it does not pro­
vide us with the tools with which to think the unity o f that ensemble.
It is here that the crucial Sorrelian/Schm ittian m om ent enters the 
theorisation o f subjectivity. The seminal insight from Sorel which, I would 
argue, informs the emphasis on limits and frontiers in Laclau and M ouffe’s 
work, is that identity is created and sustained only in oppositional, that is, 
antagon is tic relations. For example, in his Reflections on Violence Sorel argues 
that the general strike gives reality to the ‘dichotom ous thesis’ o f a society 
‘split into two fundamentally antagonistic groups.’30 Owing to the strike, 
society is ‘clearly divided into two camps, and only two, upon a battlefield.’31 
W hat is im portant here is not the actual victory o f the proletariat against 
the bourgeoisie, but the very fact of the open confrontation between the two 
groups: without confrontation there is no identity.32
It is this centrality of confrontation to the constitution o f identity that 
the idea of political frontiers most crucially captures. This is equally evident 
in Mouffe’s other writings, in which it is Schmitt, rather than Sorel who acts 
as source o f inspiration in o rder to capture the essence o f the political 
moment, as the m om ent of confrontation between ‘friend’ and ‘enem y’. 
Drawing on Schmitt, Mouffe argues that:
... every definition of a “we” implies the delimitation of a “frontier” and 
the designation of a “them.”33 
and that:
A radical democratic politics agrees with Schmitt that the friend/en­
emy distinction is central to politics. No struggle is possible against 
relations of subordination without the establishment of a frontier ...34
30 From this it is also evident that Laclau and M ouffe’s theorisation of the form ation of 
political frontiers in so-called Third World societies, as frontiers which divide society 
into two dichotom ous camps, takes much from  Sorel’s analysis.
31 Sorel, in Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology, p. 64.
32 E. Laclau, ‘George Sorel, Objectivity and the Logic ofV iolence’, pp. 3-4, unpublished 
manuscript. This Sorellian emphasis, I would argue, also influences Laclau and 
Mouffe’s reading of the constitution o f ‘popular struggles’, which I criticise fo r its 
naturalism below.
33 C. Mouffe, ‘Feminism, citizenship and radical dem ocratic politics’, in J. Butler and 
Joan W. Scott, Feminists Theorise the Political, Routledge, 1992, p. 379.
34 C. Mouffe, ‘Radical democracy or liberal dem ocracy?’, Socialist Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 
1990, p. 64.
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W hat is abundantly clear is that the category of political frontiers, far 
from  being a purely ‘form al’ mechanism which may account for the consti­
tution of identity, is intimately related to a set of assumptions concerning 
the role of conflict in identity formation and struggle.35
Two related questions arise from this characterisation of identity in 
terms of political frontiers, the implications of which I will explore in the 
final section of this article. The first concerns the form of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
critique of essentialism, and the possible alternative ways in which such a 
critique may be developed; the second concerns the consequences of an 
alternative critique, and the different directions in which it may lead. In 
developing these points, it has to be emphasised that the aim is no t simply 
to look for alternatives, bu t to explore the consequences of an alternative 
which simultaneously addresses the problem of the conflation of the formal 
and political conditions in the theorisation of identity.
The emphasis on the dimension of negativity is evident also in Laclau 
and M ouffe’s account of the ordering of political space and their analysis of 
the logic of operation of political forces. In order to further clarify the de­
velopm ent of the idea of frontiers and its relation to the ordering of politi­
cal space, it is necessary to look at the non-Marxist sources on which they 
drew. In this respect, the relational account of linguistic identity developed 
by Ferdinand de Saussure is of particular significance.36 Laclau and Mouffe 
transposes Saussure’s account of syntagmatic and paradigmatic/associative 
relations to the political terrain, arguing that identity is constituted, and socio­
political space ordered  through the operation of both systems of difference 
(syntagmatic relations) and  systems of equivalence (paradigm atic rela­
tions) ,37 From this basic starting-point concerning the dual axes constitu-
35 It is crucial to question the proclivity towards naturalism in Schmitt, as is particularly 
evident in his tendency to talk of opposing groups in concrete terms, as well as the 
tendency towards a valuation of homogeneity over difference. Connolly, in a recent 
review of M ouffe’s work on the political, argues that Schmitt’s text ‘is governed by a 
covert aesthetic o f hom ogeneity - an identification of the beautiful with unity and 
strength and the ugly with diversity and weakness - that exacerbates the political logic 
o f exclusion.’ W. E. Connolly, ‘Review Essay: Twilight of the Idols’, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 130.
36 Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics was, of course, seminal in the theoretical 
elaboration o f the m ovem ent from  structuralism to post-structuralism.
37 Saussure summ arises the distinction in the following m anner: ‘From the associative 
and syntagmatic viewpoint a linguistic unit is like a fixed part of a building, e.g., a 
colum n. On the one hand, the column has a certain relation to the architrave that it 
supports’ the arrangem ent o f the two units in space suggests a syntagmatic relation. 
O n the o ther hand, if the colum n is Doric, it suggests a m ental comparison of this 
style with others (Ionic, Corinthian, etc.) although none of these elements is present
59
Aletta J. Norval
tive of identity, Laclau and Mouffe develop their account of the division o f 
social space.
In a move which parallels their critique of attempts to theorise identity 
in positive terms, they argue that the logic o f difference never manages to 
constitute a fully sutured space since systems of difference only partially de­
fine relational identities. In order to present itself as objective and differen­
tial, that is, in order to individuate itself, certain elements have to be expelled. 
The objectivity of identity thus requires the expulsion o f a ‘surplus of m ean­
ing’, made possible through the construction of sets o f equivalences which 
define that which is radically ‘o ther’. The production o f frontier effects for 
Laclau and Mouffe thus come into existence through the operadon of systems 
of equivalence which construct the beyond as that which it is not. Identity is 
thus not individuated through a set of positive elements, but through the crea­
tion of politicalfrontiers which divide political space into equivalential construc­
tions and externalisations.
On this account, any enum eration o f positive characteristics will be 
insufficient to individuate identity since there is no principle which can bring 
to a halt the almost endless possibilities of elements which can be articulated 
together as merely different from each other. A principle of articulation is 
thus needed to stop the play of differences, delimiting identity from what it is 
not. T hat is, the drawing o f a political fro n tie r is necessary in o rd er to 
individuate an identity.38 The consequences of the ethico-theoretical decision 
which I located in the nature and character of Laclau and Mouffe’s critique 
of essentialism is, thus, also evident in their utilisation and elaboration of 
Saussure’s insights into the nature o f individuation o f (linguistic) identity. 
Saussure’s theorisation at no point privileges the m om ent of the paradigmatic 
over the syntagmatic.39 The huge emphasis on the form er in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s rendering of Saussure follows the same structure of argum entation 
as the one elaborated above with respect to Gramsci: difference is subordi­
nated to equivalence as a precondition for the individuation of identity.40
in space: the relation is associative.’ F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Collins, 
1974, pp. 123-4. It is im portant to note, however, that in the linguistic argum ent on 
the relation between paradigms and syntagms, there is no a priori privileging of the 
paradigmatic moment.
38 The construction of an equivalence between the different groupings is possible only 
on condition that the focus shifts from the concrete identity o f each group, to that 
by which they are commonly threatened.
39 In fact, it could be argued that for Saussure the syntagmatic is privileged over the 
paradigm atic since he states that, from  the po in t o f view o f the  organisation of 
language, systagmatic solidarities are the most striking. Saussure, Course, p. 127.
40 In this sense, more recent publications by Laclau, can be argued to be a reiteration  
of an argum ent already implicit in Hegemony.
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Having established the conceptual roots and basic dimensions of the 
logics involved in the drawing of political frontiers, it is now necessary to 
look in m ore detail at several further specifications o f this category. The 
category of political frontiers in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is intimately 
bound  up  with a num ber of o ther issues. I will concentrate here on how it 
informs Laclau and M ouffe’s account of variations in the character of fron­
tier formation in the cases of advanced industrial societies and so-called Third 
World contexts respectively.
II. The Ordering of Political Space
Political frontiers serve not only to individuate identity, bu t also to 
organise political space through the simultaneous operation of the logics of 
equivalence and difference. The simultaneous operation of these logics in 
the construction of political frontiers may be elucidated with reference to 
the Gramscian idea o f transformism. Transformism, for Gramsci, is a proc­
ess that involves a gradual but continuous absorption o f ‘the active elements 
produced  by allied groups - and even of those which came from antagonis­
tic groups and seem ed irreconcilably hostile.’41 A transformist project, ex­
pressed in terms of the operation of the logics of equivalence and differ­
ence, will consist of efforts to expand the systems of difference defining a 
dom inant bloc, and if such a project is successful, will result in a lessening 
o f the antagonistic potential o f the remaining excluded elements. A failure 
o f transformism, on the o ther hand, may lead to the expansion of the logic 
o f equivalence, the construction of clear-cut political frontiers and a prolif­
eration and deepening, ra ther than a limitation, of antagonistic relations.
Laclau and Mouffe argue that an expansion of the logic of difference 
tends to ‘complexify’ social space, while the opposite situation, where the 
logics o f equivalence is expanded, will tend to a ‘simplification’ of such 
space.42 Given this, they elaborate a series of political logics which demand
41 Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, pp. 58-9.
42 It has to be po in ted  out here that the logics of equivalence and difference stand to 
one an o th er in a relation  o f reciprocal delimitation. Consequently, neither the 
conditions o f total equivalence, nor that of total difference ever fully obtain. Following 
D errida, I would add that they are always found in hierarchical com bination, where 
one takes precedence over another in the ordering of political space. On this reading, 
the m om ent of frontiers would not be privileged apriorias it is in the work o f Laclau 
and Mouffe. Rather, which dim ension takes precedence would depend entirely on 
the political context u n d er discussion.
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further attention. These concern the distinction between popular and dem o­
cratic struggles in relation to First and Third  world contexts; the question 
of the complexity of frontiers; the friend/enem y distinction and the central­
ity of antagonistic opposition to Laclau and M ouffe’s account o f identity 
formation.
Let us quote the relevant passage where the first set of distinctions 
are articulated, since much depends on the exact form ulation. Laclau and 
Mouffe m aintain that:
... an im p o rtan t differential characteristic  m ay be estab lished  betw een  
advanced industria l societies an d  th e  p e rip h e ry  o f  th e  cap ita list w orld: 
in th e  form er, th e  p ro life ra tio n  o f  p o in ts  o f  an tag o n ism  p e rm its  th e  
m ultip lication  o f  dem ocratic struggles, b u t these  struggles, given th e ir  
diversity, do  n o t te n d  to  c o n s titu te  a ‘p e o p le ’, th a t  is, to  e n te r  in to  
equ ivalence w ith o n e  a n o th e r  a n d  to  d iv ide th e  p o litica l space  in to  
two antagonistic fields... We shall use th e  te rm  popular subject position to 
re fe r  to  th e  p osition  th a t is co n s titu te d  o n  th e  basis o f  d iv id in g  th e  
political space in to  two an tagonistic  cam ps: an d  democratic subject posi­
tion to re fer to  the locus o f a clearly de lim ited  an tagon ism  w hich does 
n o t divide society in  th a t way.43
On this reading, political space will be divided into two antagonistic 
camps in Third world contexts where centralised forms o f oppression en­
dow popular struggles with clearly defined enemies. This is in contrast to 
political struggles in advanced industrial societies where a proliferation of 
antagonisms makes the construction o f unified chains o f equivalence and 
the division of political space into clearly defined areas, very difficult.
It is im portant to be precise about the claims advanced here. Firstly, 
starting from the distinction between types of struggle, closely associated with 
the Gramscian and Sorellian moments identified earlier, Laclau and Mouffe 
posit a coincidence between types of struggle and o f society. Thus, they ar­
gue that political struggle in Third world contexts would tend to take the 
form of a war of movement, while in advanced industrial societies it m ore 
closely resembles war of position. In the latter case, it is difficult to foster 
unified chains of equivalence, while that is typical o f division of political 
space in Third world societies. This claim is based upon the idea that in Third 
world contexts centralised forms of oppression tend to endow popular strug­
gle with clearly defined enemies:
... in  co u n tries  o f  th e  T h ird  W orld, im p e ria lis t e x p lo ita tio n  a n d  th e  
p redom inance  o f b ru ta l an d  cen tra lised  form s o f  d o m in a tio n  te n d  from  
the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a centre, with a single and,
43 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 131.
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clearly defined enemy ... H e re  the  division o f  the political space in to  two 
fields is present from  the outset...44
Secondly, this picture is further overlaid with the claim that the divi­
sion of political space in T hird  world contexts is less complex than that in 
advanced industrial societies. The reason for this is, once again, closely bound 
up with their naturalised characterisation of Third world struggles. As Laclau 
and Mouffe argue:
... in  the  co u n tries  o f  advanced  capitalism  since the m idd le of the n in e­
te en th  century , th e  m ultip lication  and  ‘uneven developm en t’ o f dem o­
cra tic  p o sitio n s have increasing ly  d ilu ted  th e ir  sim ple an d  au tom atic  
un ity  a ro u n d  a p o p u la r  pole. ... T he conditions o f  political struggle in 
m a tu re  cap ita lism  are  increasing ly  d is tan t from  the n in e teen th -cen - 
tu ry  m o d e l o f  a c lea r-cu t ‘politics o f  fro n tie rs ’ ... T h e  p ro d u c tio n  o f 
‘f ro n tie r  e ffec ts ’ ... ceases thus to  b e  g ro u n d ed  u p o n  an  evident and  
given separation, in  a re feren tia l fram ew ork acquired once and  fo r all.45
Each o f the claims advanced also marks the site o f a problem. I will 
concentrate on the following: firstly, that there are two types of society which 
correspond to different kinds of political struggle; secondly, that these strug­
gles can be characterised as ‘popular’ and ‘democratic’; thirdly, that there 
are m arked differences in the degrees of ‘complexity’ displayed by differ­
en t kinds of political struggle. Let us take each one in turn.
It could plausibly be argued that the distinction between the First and 
T hird world is an un thought leftover from debates on the relation between 
capitalist centre and periphery and, as within that problematic, the opera­
tion of the distinction in Laclau and Mouffe’s work leaves open the possibil­
ity of a developm ental logic from one to the other. This problem cannot be 
skimmed over, for the consequences of this simplistic distinction for theo­
rising political struggles are far-reaching. In fact, what is called for here is a 
rethinking o f the nature o f the Third/F irst world distinction itself. Several 
considerations have to play a role in its recasting. It is, firstly, im portant not 
simply to do away with the distinction, since it captures something of the 
unevenness of relations and asymmetrical distribution of power and wealth 
which no post-Marxist analysis of political struggle can afford to ignore. It 
is, secondly, im portan t to consider the extent to which a binary opposition 
succeeds in capturing the complexity of forms of social division at stake in 
our contem porary world.
Against the backdrop of these considerations, most recent attempts 
to reth ink the First-Third world relation fail to provide a viable alternative.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., pp. 133-4. Emphasis in the original.
63
Aletta J. Norval
The global-local distinction, for instance, has the advantage o f no t being 
elaborated upon pre-given geographical regions, and is capable o f address­
ing the issue of unequal distribution within as well as between national and 
regional entities. However, like other binarisms (First-Third world, centre- 
periphery), it tends to overlook the complex, m ultiple constituted identi­
ties that cannot be accounted for by binary oppositions.46 Moreover, as Stuart 
Hall notes, in focusing on the local one runs the risk o f rom anticising it as 
a site of pure difference, opposed to a globalising hom ogenisation.47
The substitution of the term ‘postcolonial’ for ‘Third w orld’ is also 
not without its problems. Apart from the sometimes overly literary appro­
priation o f the term, which tend to empty out its political and critical im­
port, it has become so general that it is difficult to see how it may be de­
ployed to overcome the problems outlined above. Nevertheless, a recen t 
attem pt by Grewal and Kaplan to resituate the term  points in a direction 
which may be of use. They argue that to keep the idea of the ‘postcolonial’ 
subversive one would have to resist the cen tre/m arg in  dichotomy that situ­
ates the ‘postcolonial’ as geographically and culturally ‘o th e r’; one would 
have to refuse the construction of ‘exotic authors and subjects’.48 In o ther 
words, both the geographic and cultural specificities o f the term would have 
to be em ptied out, so as to keep in view the complex interweaving o f iden­
tity and locality which no longer are subsumable under easy binary divisions.
The thrust of this argum ent coincides with the suggestion by Howarth 
that we need to shift our attention away from concerns with space as bounded, 
and as linked to territoriality, since such conceptions valorise tradition and 
particularism. Instead, attention should be given to the elaboration of a non- 
hypostatised space which ‘can actively accom m odate and foster differences 
and plurality within it.’49 In order to do so, we need to:
b lu r an d  w eaken the  draw ing o f  c lea r b o u n d arie s  a n d  spaces so as to 
facilitate m ultiplicity an d  openness to  o therness. Similarly, we n ee d  to
46 For an insightful discussion of these issues, see I. Grewal and C. Kaplan, ‘Introduction: 
Transnational feminist practices and questions o f postm odernity’, pp. 1-33, in Grewal 
and Kaplan, Scattered Hegemonies.
47 Stuart Hall, ‘The local and the global. G lobalisation and ethnicity’, in A. D. King, 
Culture, Globalization and the World System, 1991. Hall argues that a return  to the local 
as a response to globalization will only be productive for social change if it does not 
become rooted in exclusivist and defensive enclaves. For an in-depth discussion of 
the ‘politics of location’, see, C. Kaplan, ‘T he politics o f location as transnational 
feminist practice’, pp. 137-52, in Grewal and Kaplan, Scattered Hegemonies.
48 Grewal and Kaplan, ‘In troduction’, p. 15.
49 D. Howarth, ‘Reflections on the politics o f space and tim e’, in Aneelaki, vol. l . ,n o .  1, 
pp. 53-4.
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d e c o n s tru c t o u r  n o tio n  o f  iden tity  so as to facilitate th e  perm eability  
an d  o v e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  iden tity  co n s tru c tio n .50
Even if these suggestions are followed th rough  - if contex tual dif­
fe ren ce  is no  lo n g er th o u g h t in territo ria lly  b o unded  term s, and  if it 
is, consequen tly , recogn ised  tha t the unevennesses and  asym m etries 
associated  w ith the  o rig inal d istinction  can no longer be assum ed to 
co incide  with geographically  discrete spaces - it still seems necessary to 
re ta in  d istinctions betw een d ifferen t fro n tie r  form ations in d ifferen t 
contexts.
Before this can be exp lored  m ore fully, it is necessary to deal with 
the m anner in which Laclau and  Mouffe theorise the distinction between 
kinds o f po litica l struggle  an d  the carving up of political space. They 
a rgue  tha t, co inc id ing  with the T h ird  w orld /advanced  industria l soci­
ety d istinc tion , th e re  is a d istinction  in the m anner in which frontiers 
are  fo rm ed . This leads them  to establish the d istinction  betw een popu­
lar an d  democratic sub ject positions. P opular subject positions co rre ­
spo n d  to cases w here the  social is divided paratactically  in to  two an ­
tagonistic  cam ps, and  dem ocratic  subject positions to cases where soci­
ety is n o t d iv ided  in  th a t way.51
This characterisa tion , however, gives rise to a possible confusion. 
In nam ing  these  fro n tie rs  ‘d em ocratic ’ and ‘p o p u la r’, an illegitim ate 
content is a ttr ib u te d  to a form  o f social division. T hat is, what can only 
be constituted in the process o f struggle and what has to be resu lt o f a po­
litical articulation, is tre a te d  as som eth ing  which can be read  off from  
the  form  o f  social division. T he p roblem  that arises here  is the follow­
ing: w hat is te rm ed  ‘p o p u lar struggles’, may have a dem ocratic content, 
while w hat is called  ‘dem ocratic  struggles’ are n o t always a rticu la ted  
w ith in  dem o cra tic  horizons. For exam ple, many ‘p o p u lar strugg les’ 
have b een  fo u g h t in the  nam e o f dem ocracy; one only needs to th ink  
here  o f the various anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century. Many 
‘d e m o c ra tic ’ struggles, on  the  o th e r hand , bear no re la tion  to dem oc­
racy at all.
A c learer separa tion  betw een the form  of division of social space, 
and  the substantive con ten t in terms of which that division is discursively 
constitu ted , thus needs to be m ain tained . In this respec t it may be use­
ful to reserve the  term  ‘paratactical fro n tie r’ for situations in which rela­
tively clear-cu t fro n tie rs  are a rticu la ted  in a process o f struggle; and
Howarth, ‘Reflections on the politics o f space and tim e’, p. 54.
51 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 131.
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the term  ‘fragm ented fron tie rs’ may be in tro d u ced  to characterise  con ­
texts w here tha t is n o t the case.52 T ha t would allow one  to re ta in  the 
sense o f difference in the m anner in which frontiers are constructed po­
litically, while avoiding ascribing a (political) conten t to the form in which 
social division is articulated.
But, if the distinction between different ways of dividing social space 
cannot be made in terms of the content of struggles, then  how is it possible 
to maintain the distinction, which intuitively seems a relevant and useful one? 
One way in which the thought informing the distinction may be m aintained, 
I would argue, is by emphasising the context in which struggles occur, ra ther 
than their content. In the case of a conjunctural crisis, for example, where 
structural dislocation is limited, an articulation of frontiers which divides 
the social paratactically, is unlikely to occur. Rather, one would expect to 
see an articulation of struggles around very precise issues, which may pre­
vent struggles their being ‘linked u p ’ with one another. O n the o ther hand, 
should there be a large degree of dislocation, such as that found in condi­
tions of organic crisis, the domain o f elem ents available for rearticulation 
is vastly expanded, and the likelihood o f the form ation o f frontiers around 
a wide set of equivalences, is enhanced. If the problem  is addressed in these 
terms, it is no longer a question of making a distinction between ‘types of 
society’. Rather, Laclau and Mouffe’s crucial insight into the different proc­
esses of frontier formation is retained, bu t is now related  to the degree of 
sedimentation of social forms. In addition, the distinction between frontiers
- one I have argued should be designate by the terms paratactical and frag­
mented frontiers - is no longer conceived of as a distinction in kind, bu t as 
one of degree.
If political frontiers, w hether they are paratactical or fragm ented, 
always result from processes of political articulating and struggle and if dif­
ferent ways o f dividing social space cannot be distinguished from  one an­
other on the basis of a given geographical division, they also cannot be dis­
tinguished with reference to the presum ed degree of ‘complexity’ of their 
modes of constitution. Laclau and Mouffe argue that in contrast to the case 
of ‘popular struggles’, political struggles in m ature capitalist societies tend 
to exhibit a far greater complexity, which increasingly moves away from  the 
‘n ineteenth  century’ model of a clear-cut politics of frontiers. H ere two re­
lated problems are present. First, the crucial insight into the fragm ented
52 I am emphasising the elem ent of political articulation and  struggle here, since in 
Laclau and M ouffe’s theorisation, they argue repeatedly that in T hird  world contexts 
there is a ‘given and evident’ form of separation which precedes political articulation.
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nature of (m odern) identity is ‘reserved’ for advanced industrial societies. 
Consequently, the construction of paratactical frontiers is regarded as a 
somehow less complex operation than in the case of fragm ented frontiers. 
This m isconstrual of the complex construction of paratactical frontiers oc­
curs because the m odel for paratactical frontiers/popular struggles is that 
o f the ‘n ineteenth  century’ where, on Laclau and Mouffe’s reading, lines of 
division are ‘evident and given’. The assumption that the nineteenth cen­
tury m odel of clear-cut frontiers corresponded to some ‘evident and given 
form  of division’, and that this is transposable to the thought of contem po­
rary paratactical divisions, is simply untenable. In politics, no naturalism 
exists, not for the ‘Third world’ and also not for the nineteenth century. While 
it may be the case that the non-naturalness of identity has become increas­
ingly visible over time, it does not mean that earlier lines of division were 
based upon natural and given forms of identity as Laclau and Mouffe seem 
to assume.53 O nce this is clarified, it is possible to show that the construc­
tion o f paratactical frontiers which tend to divide the social into two camps, 
is every bit as ‘com plex’ as the articulation of more fragm ented frontiers.54 
T hat is, the experience of a fragm entation and multiplication of forms of 
identification, cannot be limited to advanced capitalist societies. The pro­
duction of political frontiers -  regardless of whether they are fragmented 
or paratactical -  always proceed as a result of a complex articulation of di­
vision between the logics of inclusion and difference on the one hand, and 
that o f exclusion and negativity on the other.
It is precisely the complexity of this process of identity formation which 
is sacrificed in the over-emphasis on the m oment of antagonism in the theo­
risation offered by Laclau and Mouffe. This is particularly evident in the 
utilisation of the ‘friend /enem y’ distinction as exemplary of the nature of 
identity construction. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the us/them , friend / 
enemy distinction is necessary to the process of individuation of identity. In 
addition to the foregoing, several issues are condensed into this claim, and 
it is my contention  that they need to be treated separately if the proper 
political nature o f frontiers is to be understood in its full complexity.
53 It is in teresting  to note in this respect, that Laclau and Mouffe, in their discussion of 
the concept o f war of position, criticise Gramsci for presupposing a division of 
political space into two camps. Yet, they go on to impute a similar phenom enon to 
the ‘T hird  W orld’. See, Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 139.
54 I have analysed the complexity o f the processes involved in constructing paratactical 
frontiers in apartheid  discourse, in Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, Verso, London 
1996.
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III. General and Political Logics: From Limits to Frontiers
Instead of a single claim that the individuation o f identity necessarily 
requires the construction of a friend /enem y distinction or an antagonistic 
relation, there are in fact several different argum entative strains present in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s basic thesis. They concern, firstly, the individuation of 
identity; secondly, the relation of that process to antagonism  and frontiers; 
and, thirdly, the theorisation of frontiers themselves, specifically in relation 
to the question of complexity and the problem  o f homogeneity. As I have 
argued in Part 2, the problem  of the individuation of identity, for Laclau 
and Mouffe, arises from their critique o f essentialism which is developed in 
such away as to simultaneously privilege the m om ent of negativity, antago­
nism and frontiers. This is in sharp contrast to the intellectual ‘sources’ upon 
which they draw: in both Gramsci and Saussure, I have argued, there is no 
privileging o f the oppositional m om ent or of paradigm atic relations. For 
that, one has to turn to Sorel and Schmitt, where the oppositional m om ent 
becomes dom inant and defining. Now, it is possible, and this is the central 
thesis of the paper, that identity may be individuated without m aking essen- 
tialist claims and also without an overemphasis on the idea o f exclusion, 
opposition, antagonism, and so forth. T hat is to say, a critique of essential­
ism may be developed  w hich does not c o n fla te  the  general log ic  o f 
individuation of identity, and the specific logic o f political frontiers. For such 
a critique, one could draw on both D errida and the later W ittgenstein. In 
the case o f the latter, it is quite clear that the idea o f ‘family resem blances’ 
offers an account of identity formation which fulfils both the stipulated de­
mands. As W ittgenstein argues with respect to the concept ‘gam e’, there is 
no need for us to be able to give a Merkmal definition of ‘gam e’ to be able 
to use it. The demand for determinacy of sense is bu t one dem and am ongst 
others. This critique of the demand for determinacy of sense, however, does 
not rely on the m om ent of exclusion to think the individuation o f identity. 
This is achieved, for W ittgenstein, by the idea o f a series of overlapping 
resemblances, none of which are essential to the concept, and which makes 
it into a concept of ‘game’, and not, for example, ‘work’. It is useful to dis­
cuss in m ore detail an example of the deploym ent of W ittgenstein’s work in 
feminist theory which articulates a non-essentialist conception o f ‘w om an’. 
Linda Nicholson outlines it in the following m anner:
I w ant to  suggest th a t we th ink  o f th e  m e an in g  o f  ‘w om an’ in  the  sam e 
way th a t W ittgenstein suggested we th in k  a b o u t th e  m e an in g  o f  ‘g am e,’ 
as a w ord whose m ean ing  is n o t fo u n d  th ro u g h  th e  e luc ida tion  o f  som e 
specific characteristic  b u t is fo u n d  th ro u g h  th e  e lu c id a tio n  o f  som e
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netw ork  o f  characteristics. ... To give up  on  the idea th a t ‘w om an’ has 
o n e  clearly  specifiab le  m e an in g  does n o t en ta il th a t it has no  m ean­
ing . R a ther, th is  way o f  th in k in g  ab o u t m ean in g  w orks u p o n  the  as­
su m p tio n  th a t  such  p a tte rn s  are fo u n d  in  h istory  a n d  m ust be d ocu ­
m e n te d  as su c h .55
It is the absence of such a non-essentialist specifiable meaning or ‘mini­
mal rem ainder’ which forces Laclau and Mouffe, contra Wittgenstein, to 
conflate the m om ent of individuation of identity and articulation of politi­
cal frontiers. To repeat, for Wittgenstein it is perfectly possible to think a 
non-essentialist conception of identity without arguing that identity can only 
be individuated with reference to what it excludes. A similar argum ent can 
be developed from a Derridean perspective. Derrida’s discussion of the role 
o f iterability in the constitution of identity, proceeds along similar lines to 
the argum ent sketched ou t above. In the case of iteration, the repeatability 
of a word is assured by the fact that any repetition involves a repetition of 
the same. Yet this repetition cannot in any simple m anner be regarded as 
repetition of the same as essentially the same, since every repetition always 
already involves alteration. Thus, an essentialist form of individuation is 
avoided, while the minimal rem ainder forecloses the need to have recourse 
to pu re  exclusion as the necessary foundation of any process of indivi­
duation.56
Once this is accepted, it is possible to retheorise the relation between 
the process o f individuation of identity and the articulation of political fron­
tiers. As I have argued, the process of individuation of identity has to be 
separated from that of the articulation of frontiers, or the moment of an­
tagonism. T hat is, while differentiation is a m om ent in the individuation of 
identity, the general logic does not require that the critique of essentialism 
has to be conflated with the political logic of antagonism. Thus, contra Laclau 
and Mouffe, where the concept of political frontier does both the work of 
individuating identity, and indicating the point at which antagonistic rela­
tions are constituted, it is my contention that the general logical argum ent 
concerning the individuation of identity should not be conflated with the 
specific argum ent concerning the political logic of antagonism. This confla­
ÜÜL. Nicholson, ‘In terp reting  g en d e r’, pp. 60-1, in Nicholson and Seidman, Social 
Postmodernism. N icholson develops this approach in order to avoid a naturalistic 
reductionism  and reference to a non-historical conception of ‘the body’ which has 
tended  to g round  many fem inist arguments.
56 It could be argued that the idea o f the ‘constitutive outside’ as developed in S taten’s 
reading of Derrida, could act as a counter to the argum ent presented above. I return 
to this at a la ter po in t in the argum ent. See, H. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 
University o f Nebraska Press, London 1984, pp. 15-9.
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tion creates serious theoretical and political problem s which can only be 
resolved by separating the two argum ents. This is im portant, no t only for 
the attainm ent of conceptual clarity, bu t also for a clarification o f the conse­
quences for political analysis which may be argued to derive from  the dif­
ferent accounts offered above. Following W ittgenstein and Derrida, I would 
argue that the general logic of individuation tells us nothing about where 
and how political antagonisms may arise. That means that the general (logi­
cal) argum ent concerning the necessity of distinguishing the self from  an 
other in order to individuate identity,57 has to be separated from  the fur- 
ther question concerning the problem  of when such ‘oppositions’ becom e 
exclusionary and antagonistic. It is only once these argum ents are system­
atically distinguished, that we can address the difficult problem s regarding 
where and on luhat basis frontiers are and ought to be, drawn. It is only so 
long as these two dimensions of the argum ent are kept separate, that we 
can refine our theorisation of the political logic of frontiers.
In Part 2 I began to outline in what way it is necessary to refine and 
deepen the important insights developed by Laclau and Mouffe in their work 
on political frontiers. There is, however, one issue which dem ands further 
explication, namely, the question o f the ‘complexity’ of political frontiers. 
Here many o f the issues discussed above come together. I have thus far 
advanced the argum ent that the process through which paratactical fron­
tiers are constituted is no less complex than that of fragm ented frontiers. 
However, a further issue needs to be addressed in this respect. It concerns 
the complexity of the self/o ther relation at the core of frontiers. The proc­
ess of production of subjectivity is m uch m ore complex than the ‘frie n d / 
enemy’ distinction would lead one to believe.58 In this respect it may be 
helpful to turn briefly to the deconstruction o f binary relations, and to ex­
tend insights drawn from it to the theorisation of that com plex relation. 
Derrida’s work on binary hierarchies at the core of the metaphysics of pres­
ence - essence/accident, m ind/body, speech/w riting, and so forth - shows 
both that the identity of each of the terms is essentially reliant on that of its 
other, and that the frontier separating the two, is essentially im pure. Now, 
what Derrida says about philosophical texts holds mutatis mutandis for all
57 The general argum ent is one that is widely accepted in the literature on identity. See, 
for example, K. A. Appiah, ‘African Identities’, p. 110, in Nicholson and Seidm an, 
Social Postmodernism.
58 While it has to be recognised that especially in Laclau’s recent work there has been 
a shift towards a more psychoanalytic account of the constitution of the subject, it is 
not clear that that theorisation has any pertinence for the argum ent on  political 
frontiers.
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identity in general, since the non-closure he describes, is the non-closure of 
any discursive form. Deconstruction thus not only lays bare the essential 
violence contained in the conditions under which it becomes possible for 
dualisms to be established, bu t also brings into view - and this is what is 
im portant for the analysis at this point - the very impurity of dualistic thought. 
It is for this reason that the idea of a ‘constitutive outside’, as developed by 
Staten in his reading of Derrida and extended to political analysis by Laclau, 
should n o t be taken as a m odel for the theorisation of political identities.59 
The idea of a constitutive outside is misleading to the extent that it lends 
itself to be read simply as emphasising the distinction self/other, rather than 
leading to a deconstruction of that binary.60 The crucial insight offered by 
deconstructive analysis is that it uncovers the essential subversion of the ‘sepa­
rate identities’ upon which dualistic thought relies. As Derrida argues in The 
Other Heading.
I m ust n o n e th e le ss  fo rm u la te  in  a som ew hat dogm atic way ... a very dry 
n ecessity  w hose c o n se q u e n c e s  co u ld  affect o u r  e n tire  p ro b lem atic : 
what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself. N o t to  n o t have an 
identity , b u t n o t to  b e  able to identify itself, to be ab le to  say “m e” or 
“w e”; to  b e  able to  take th e  fo rm  o f  a subject only in the  non-identity  to 
itself or, if  you prefer, only in  the d ifference with itself [avec soi]. T here  
is n o  cu ltu re  o r  cu ltu ra l iden tity  w ithou t this d ifference with itself.61
From this, it must be clear that the relation between ‘the self and ‘the 
o th e r’ is infinitely m ore complex than the dichotomous friend/enem y dis­
tinction allows. As D errida argues, the outside infects the inside, and vice 
versa, m aking any simplistic dualism and e ith e r/o r thought suspect.62 The
59 Even though I have utilised this idea in my own work, I am now of the opinion that the 
potential m isreadings which it inspires, could be so dam aging that the use of the 
concept fo r the purposes o f political analysis should be abandoned.
60 Jud ith  Butler suggests one way in which the idea of the ‘constitutive outside’ could be 
rendered  m ore sensitive to distinctly political issues. She argues that one ought to 
distinguish between ‘the constitution of a political field that produces and naturalises 
tha t constitutive outside and a political field that produces and renders contingent the 
specific param eters of that constitutive outside.’ Whilst going some way to avoid the 
problem  I have specified, this form ulation still leaves too close an association between 
the individuation o f an identity and its political articulation in antagonistic and 
exclusionary forms. See,J. Butler, ‘Contingent foundations’, p. 20, in j. Butler an d j. 
Scott (eds), Feminists Theorise the Political, Routledge, New York 1992.
61 J. D errida, The Other Heading, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis 1992, pp. 9-10.
62 This does not, however, m ean that identity is so open that it becomes contradictory 
to speak o f identity at all. Q uite the contrary. For Derrida the them e of identity and 
therefore o f stability is always crucial to the treatm ent o f identity, that is, if one 
understands by tha t stability no t som ething in the order o f absolute solidity, but
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full implications of the deconstructive focus on the subversion o f apparently 
natural dualisms, thus, have to be taken on board. This m eans that an ad­
equate theorisation of political frontiers has to show both the impurity o f all 
forms of relation identity, and has to make visible the irreducible multiplicity 
of the site in which those violent dualisms are produced. Foregrounding 
the friend/enem y distinction as the essence of all politics precludes sensitiv­
ity to the multiplicity and plurality of the ‘betw een’, the fact that there is an 
‘excess o f being’ - as Connolly argues - o f difference over identity, and  it 
directs attention away from the complexity of the processes in which politi­
cal identities are forged.63
Moreover, it could lead one to believe that all identity has to be thought 
in the form us/them . The consequences o f this ‘m ust’ for political analysis, 
if not for practical politics, are potentially very damaging. In terms o f politi­
cal analysis, it tends to direct attention to the m om ent o f exclusion, to the 
development of antagonisms, that is, to the relation to ‘the o th e r’ at the ex­
pense of an analysis of those dimensions of identity which cannot be captured in 
the us/them form. It is here that the fu rther consequences o f following the 
alternative critique of essentialism outlined above, becom e apparent. From 
a Wittgenstinian point of view, it would be im portant to focus, no t only on 
the m om ent of differentiation from ‘the o ther’ bu t on the ‘minimal rem ain­
der’ which makes this identity this identity and no t an other. This insight 
allows one to acknowledge the im portance and specificity of capturing the 
contextual feature of identity formation, at the same time as it recognises
rather as standing in the order of historicity, a stability which can always once again 
be destabilised. However, the question remains as to how identity can be characterised 
as stable, such that it rem ains recognisable as the  sam e across many d iffe ren t 
occurrences. Here the crucial notion of iterability, which designates both repetition 
and alteration, provides a tool with which to account for identity w ithout assuming 
an eternal essence to be grounding such identity. For D errida, iterability presum es a 
minimal rem ainder which is not reducible to a singular essence, which is repeatable 
in principle and which allows for such stabilisation to occur. Yet, this elem ent is always 
im pure, its m eaning never quite sutured, allowing for it to be altered  when grafted 
onto new contexts. This allows a fu rther deepening  of ou r understanding  of the 
essentially contextual dimension of the form ation o f identity which, nevertheless, 
always involves an elem ent of decon tex tualiza tion . M oreover, it facilita tes an 
understanding o f the interplay o f both continuities and discontinuities in historical 
articulation o f identity. For a discussion o f iterability, see J. D errida, ‘L im ited Inc .’, 
Glyph 2, pp. 192-254,1977.
63 Connolly, ‘Review essay’, p. 133. Connolly also points out that both Foucault and 
Nietzsche attem pts to foster an ethic of care for abundance, before closing on a 
fixed, systematic set of limitations.
72
Frontiers in Question
the role that differentiation from an other plays in the processes constitu­
tive o f political identity.64
To recapitulate. The core of my argum ent has been that the general 
logic o f individuation has to be distinguished from the formation of politi­
cal frontiers (and the constitution of antagonistic forms of identity). One of 
the consequence of this refocussing is that it then becomes necessary to in­
vestigate the specificity of the political logic o f frontiers. The constitution of 
political frontiers becomes one possibility of articulation amongst others, 
ra ther than the essence o f the individuation of identity. This weakening of 
the claims for political frontiers, far from invalidating Laclau and Mouffe’s 
argum ent, in fact reveals their specific contribution to the theorisation of 
the constitution of political identities in its full light. Theirs remains a valu­
able insight into the constitution of antagonistic forms o f identification. 
However, the fact that the stronger claims for political frontiers and antago­
nism -  namely that it is essential to any individuation of identity -  has been 
pu t in to  question, allows one to take cognisance of those dimensions of 
political identity which are equally im portant in the analysis of ideologies, 
bu t which escape the focus on exclusion and antagonism. Finally, it allows 
one to refine the theorisation of political forms o f ‘exclusion’.
Concerning the political logic of exclusion, it is im portant to go beyond 
the argum ent, pu t forward by Laclau and Mouffe, concerning the grounds 
upon which frontiers may be drawn. Laclau has argued that this question 
can only be answered conjuncturally with reference to a concrete situation.65 
To some exten t this is, of course, correct: it is not possible to prescribe, in 
an a priori fashion, on what grounds and where distinctions and frontiers 
will be drawn; too much depends on political traditions, context and so forth. 
However, this answer masks two further problems, both of which are linked 
to a lack of theorisation o f different forms of exclusion.
The first concerns the issue already raised in different guises through­
ou t this paper, namely the conflation of lim its/frontiers and antagonistic 
relations. If the argum ent that the structure of identity formation requires 
that identity is form ed through differentiation, but that it does not logically 
follow that all differences have to be treated as ‘evil’, as ‘o ther’ is accepted, 
it becomes possible to theorise a more nuanced account of relations to the 
other. On this reading, the site of identity formation can be regarded as one 
o f indeterminacy, it is an open space for considering a variety of ways in which
64 It is in this respect that some of the formulations drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis 
becom e problem atic. See my discussion of this problem in Deconstructing Apartheid 
Discourse, pp. 62-4.
65 Howarth and  Norval, ‘N egotiating the paradoxes’, pp. 46-7.
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the relation between self and o ther may be conceived. From  this site, it 
becomes possible to think of social division in terms o ther than the frie n d / 
foe relation. What is important, from this perspective, is the possibility of 
relating to those who are ‘different’ without excluding them  as ‘enem ies’; 
of consolidating identity through the constitution o f difference ra ther than 
otherness. This would involve doing justice to both sameness and difference, 
to conceive and develop practices in which it is possible to recognise the 
instability of identity, and to respect the otherness of the o ther.66 Contem ­
porary political theory is replete with examples, systematically drawn from 
historical cases, which outline different ways of thinking and systematising 
different relations to ‘the o ther’. Baum an’s work on the figure of the figure 
of the stranger; Dillon’s work on the figure of the refugee; and Connoly’s 
writings on relations of agonistic respect. Since all of these are forms of dif­
ferentiation, are related to greater or lesser degree to political circumstances 
they avoid the problem of falling into empty formalisms, so missing nuances 
which are both politically and theoretically im portant and interesting. These 
may to a greater or lesser extent be systematised, even if such a systématisa­
tion would not occur outside of all context. Indeed, my argum ent would be 
that a systématisation outside of all context, will simply lead to an empty and 
abstract formalism. Rather, it is at this point that sensitivity to historical con­
text and the nature and character of exclusions becom e crucial.67
66 Once this separation is effected, it may then be possible to articulate a specifically 
(radical) dem ocratic practice of rela ting  to d ifference. As C onnolly argues, a 
dem ocratic politics o f difference, in which the conventional standards sealed in 
‘transcendental m ortar’ are loosened th rough  contestation, is a politics which would 
refuse to resign itself unambiguously to limits imposed by the structural requirem ents 
of any particular order. Instead of succumbing to the tem ptation to convert differences 
into otherness, into evil, a democratic politics ought to ensure that as many differences 
as possible are drawn in, before the inevitable m om ent of closure arises. Cf. W. E. 
Connolly, Identity/Difference, Ithaca, New York 1991, pp. 8-9.
67 Nevertheless, as is clear from the work of, for exam ple, Balibar, it may be possible to 
map som ething of the complexity of models of racism, and the forms of exclusion 
which it fosters and sustains: the distinctions between auto-referential (those in which 
the bearers o f prejudice, exercising physical o r symbolic violence, designate themselves 
as representatives of a superior race) and hetero-referential racism (in which it is, by 
contrast, the victims of racism who are assigned to an inferior o r evil race); between 
a racism of exterm ination/elim ination (an ‘exclusive’ racism; e.g. Nazism) and racism 
of oppression or exploitation (‘inclusive’ racism; e.g. colonial racisms) all give one 
im portant insights into the m anner in which contem porary exclusions may function. 
What is particularly striking in Balibar’s work is his sensitivity to the fact tha t these 
categorisations are not ideally pure structures but they identify historical trajectories 
which disallows talk of a single invariant racism, or a single form  of exclusion. Indeed, 
what is crucial in his analysis is the emphasis on the interm ixing and impurity o f these
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It is finally necessary to consider whether these alternative forms of 
th inking about d ifferentiation are compatible with Laclau and M ouffe’s 
political account of identity formation. While some dimensions of their ac­
count may conceivably be stretched to accommodate those insights, it is my 
in tuition that a W ittgenstinian understanding of the individuation is more 
open to the issues raised here. This is so since, while it does give attention 
to differentiation, it does not privilege, in an a priori fashion, the m om ent 
o f exclusion. Politically, we have seen that the emphasis on exclusion is dan­
gerous in that it leaves us, metaphorically speaking, with white/black choices, 
and it disallows the theorisation of more complex interweavings which are 
constitutive of the processes of identity formation. Theoretically, it comes 
perilously close to that ‘red feather’ described by Derrida:
T h e  e th ic  o f  speech  is th e  delusion o f p resence m astered . ... the delu­
sion o r  lu re  designates first a h u n te r ’s stratagem . It is a te rm  of falconry:
“a p iece  o f  re d  fea th e r  ... in  the  form  o f a b ird , which serves to recall 
th e  b ird  o f  p rey  w hen it does n o t re tu rn  straight to the  fist.” ... To rec­
ogn ise  w riting  in  speech , th a t is to say d ifferance an d  th e  absence of 
sp eech , is to  b eg in  to  th in k  th e  lu re. T h ere  is no  eth ics w ithou t the 
p re se n ce  o f the other b u t also, and  consequently , w ithout absence, dis­
sim u la tio n , d e to u r, d iffe rance , w riting .68
Unless we take this into account, we run the risk of rem aining trapped 
by a conception of frontiers which emphasises closure, antagonism and strict 
delim itation, instead of that dimension of frontiers which promise a certain 
opening, a certain lack o f definition, which is nevertheless not unusable.
form s o f ca tego risa tion  in o u r  con tem porary  world. E. Balibar, ‘Racism and 
N ationalism ’, pp. 38-9, in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class. 
t>8 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1974, pp. 139-40.

